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5	Belgium, 1870–1920	5
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12		12
13		13
14	In this chapter we address the manner by which the Belgian state reacted towards	14
15	the presence of German immigrants and their descendants on its territory in the	15
16	half-century between 1870 and 1920. ¹ We refer to Germans who migrated to	16
17	Belgium before the First World War and their descendants as a Belgian ethnic	17
18	minority and, depending on their citizenship, we call them German Belgians	18
19	or Belgian Germans. We want to verify whether, due to the war, a biological-	19
20	essentialist understanding of the German population was developed. Our	20
21	hypothesis is that while before the war their presence in Belgian society was no	21
22	issue, the war made them eternally foreign to the Belgian authorities (or ethnic	22
23	Germans to the German authorities). We look into the attitudes of the Belgian	23
24	and German states towards this population before and during the occupation	24
25	of Belgium in the First World War. Central to the paper is whether the policy	25
26	towards this population changed at the beginning of the twentieth century due	26
27	to the Great War. The hypothesis to verify is that state policy changed from a	27
28	civic management of this population to an ethnic treatment. The ways in which	28
29	the Belgian and German policies towards this group interacted is analyzed.	29
30		30
31		31
32	Immigration from Germany and Austria-Hungary	32
33		33
34	The 1890 census, when for the first time information was collected on the	34
35	citizenship of those residing on Belgian territory, indicates that nearly 50,000	35
36	Germans were living in Belgium. Subsequent censuses show that the number	36
37	of Germans in Belgium increased only slightly. These snapshots can be	37
38	supplemented with information on annual immigration. From 1899, the	38
39		39
40		40
41	¹ With a view to the small number of individuals from Austria-Hungary, and to ease	41
42	the reading of this chapter, these persons are included in the term ‘German immigrants and	42
	their descendants’ or, depending on their citizenship, Belgian Germans or German Belgians.	

1 immigration of foreigners as collected by the Department of Public Security was 1
 2 structured according to country of citizenship. This data informs us that 95,000 2
 3 citizens from the German and Austro-Hungarian empires migrated to Belgium 3
 4 between 1899 and 1910, although the number of Germans in Belgium in this 4
 5 period rose only by slightly more than 6000 individuals. While some Germans 5
 6 became Belgian, the slight increase of the German population indicates that 6
 7 only a small minority of the German immigrants finally settled in Belgium.² 7

8 This German immigration was predominantly urban.³ The Germans were 8
 9 concentrated in four cities: Brussels, Antwerp, Liège and Verviers. Each of the 9
 10 cities attracted various types of German immigrants. The gender balance shows 10
 11 a slight female prevalence on the national scale. This partly attests to the settled 11
 12 nature of German immigration to Belgium, which expressed itself in family 12
 13 migration. The large number of young German women in domestic service in 13
 14 Belgium also helps to explain this female prevalence. Liège and Verviers attracted 14
 15 mostly young, single males from the Rhineland for semi- or unskilled work, 15
 16 respectively in mining, metal work and the textile industry. Brussels and Antwerp 16
 17 attracted a socially more differentiated German population. In the latter cities 17
 18 (urban) long-distance migration was predominant. This was especially the case 18
 19 in Antwerp, a transit port city of great significance for German exports, which 19
 20 attracted German traders and businessmen. In both Antwerp and Brussels, 20
 21 German immigrants tended to work in economic activities aimed at the German 21
 22 economy. These immigrants were the visible expression of the fusion between 22
 23 the Belgian and German economies in these years of accelerated globalization. 23

24
 25 Table 6.1 Number of Inhabitants in Belgium of German or Austro- 25
 26 Hungarian Nationality 26

	1890	1900	1910
29 German Empire	47,338	53,758	57,010
30 Austria-Hungary	1427	2,991	5927

32
 33 The German communities in Belgium found expression in a great variety 33
 34 of German associations, including schools, churches, a German lodge, 34
 35 associations for mutual assistance, choirs, nationalistic-militaristic associations 35
 36 and professional federations. Liège and Verviers had fewer associations than 36

37
 38 ² Annual immigration figures in *Statistique Judiciaire de la Belgique*. 37
 38

39 ³ Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, *La Belgique entre la France et l'Allemagne 1905–1914* 39
 40 (Paris, 1994), 126–31; Greta Devos and Hilde Greefs, 'The German Presence in 40
 41 Antwerp in the Nineteenth Century', *IMIS-Beiträge*, 14(2000), 105–28; Carl Petersen 41
 42 and Otto Scheel et al. (eds), *Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtum*, Vol. I 42
 (Breslau, 1933), 346–70.

1 Antwerp and Brussels. This difference may be explained by the varied social 1
2 profile of the German immigrants in each of the cities: for higher social groups 2
3 that were more numerous in Antwerp and Brabant the social functionality of 3
4 German associations was more important than for workers, who dominated in 4
5 Liège and Verviers. For example, in the German schools in Belgium, children of 5
6 merchants were strongly represented as it was considered important for these 6
7 children to be proficient in German and to be fully aware of German culture 7
8 with a view to nurturing business contacts with Germany.⁴ The expressions of 8
9 Germanness did not emanate from a closed ethnic community. In Brussels, the 9
10 German school with instruction in French, English and German had, by 1914, 10
11 students of very different origin, one quarter of them being Belgians. The school 11
12 was an elite school for the cosmopolitan higher classes.⁵ Also the choice of 12
13 partner of German immigrants in Belgium shows their openness to the new 13
14 environment. The German immigrants who settled in Belgium had come young 14
15 and unmarried to Belgium and often married local women.⁶ 15

16 Belgium was a cosmopolitan society in the nineteenth century. Germans 16
17 and other aliens were considered equal to Belgians except for those provisions 17
18 stipulated by the law. Very few Belgian laws made an exception for aliens. They 18
19 had access to economic activities, including the labour market, on almost 19
20 equal terms with citizens. Foreigners could even be public servants, except for 20
21 the top positions. Public life was organized autonomously and locally, with 21
22 little intervention from the central state. Even where the Belgian state made 22
23 a difference, for example, in church–state relations, the foreign nationality of 23
24 those who resided in its territory was largely irrelevant to the Belgian state. 24
25 Churches in Belgium could obtain public subsidies; this implied that the salary 25
26 of a minister of a German Protestant church serving mostly the religious needs 26
27 of foreigners in Belgium could be paid by the Belgian authorities even if he had 27
28 foreign citizenship. Even for military service all men in Belgium were equal. 28
29 They all, to a large extent independent of their citizenship, had to draw lots for 29
30 military service. 30

31
32

33 ⁴ *Bericht über das 73. Schuljahr der Allgemeinen Deutschen Schule zu Antwerp, erstattet* 33
34 *vom Direktor Dr B. Gaster* (Antwerp, 1913), 4. 34

35 ⁵ Nathan Vanwildemeersch, 'Van "Unserem lieben Köning" tot "Deutschland über 35
36 Alles": Duitse scholen in België, 1890–1920' (unpublished University of Ghent MA 36
37 thesis, 2010); Sophie de Schaepdrijver, 'We who are So Cosmopolitan': *The War Diary of* 37
38 *Constance Graeffe, 1914–1915* (Brussels, 2008), 102. 38

39 ⁶ A sample of 123 German male immigrants who had been living in Belgium in 1914 39
40 for at least four years shows that those who chose to settle in Belgium were slightly more 40
41 likely to be married to Belgian than German women. Frank Caestecker and Antoon 41
42 Vrints, 'German Immigrants and their Families between Scylla and Charybdis, Belgium 42
(1914–1920)' (unpublished paper).

1 In this liberal era in which the role of the state was still restricted, citizenship 1
 2 offered few advantages in everyday life. The immigrants from the German 2
 3 Empire and their descendants residing in Belgium mostly did not apply to 3
 4 become Belgians. Becoming Belgian could be advantageous. Belgium did not 4
 5 introduce universal male conscription until 1903, whereas in the German Empire 5
 6 and in particular in Prussia, military service had become part of citizens' duties 6
 7 since the early nineteenth century. Even those in Belgium who drew the lot for 7
 8 military service could, if they were well off, send a replacement.⁷ As German law 8
 9 provided that Germans abroad who no longer had contact with a German state 9
 10 lost their nationality after 10 years a considerable number of German emigrants 10
 11 became stateless. This territorial understanding of German citizenship was a 11
 12 legacy of the *ancien régime* conception of state community. From 1871 onwards 12
 13 loss of German nationality could be avoided by having one's name inscribed on 13
 14 a list kept at a German consulate. Still it seems that many Germans in Belgium 14
 15 did not bother about retaining their German citizenship and became stateless 15
 16 after ten years in Belgium. 16

17 For most of the nineteenth century very few Germans or former Germans 17
 18 wanted to become Belgians. For first generation immigration this had to be 18
 19 done through the naturalization procedure which was expensive and time- 19
 20 consuming. Between 1830 and 1914 about a thousand people originating from 20
 21 the German Empire had become Belgian by means of naturalization.⁸ Naturalized 21
 22 Belgians were considered legally to be second-rate Belgians. For children born 22
 23 in Belgium of a German father, the Belgian nationality laws provided for the 23
 24 possibility of opting for Belgian nationality when they reached adulthood. 24
 25 By a simple declaration of native birth upon reaching the age of majority an 25
 26 individual could acquire Belgian citizenship as of right. Belgians by option were 26
 27 considered fully fledged Belgians and equal to Belgians by descent.⁹ Still, deep 27
 28 into the 19th century, the descendants of immigrants rarely used this easily 28
 29 accessible opportunity to acquire Belgian citizenship. Aside from the possibility 29
 30 of participating in political life, being Belgian, German or stateless made little 30
 31 difference in how these immigrants functioned in nineteenth-century Belgium. 31

32 The limited importance of citizenship in nineteenth-century Belgium is 32
 33 also illustrated by the lot of the Belgian women who married Germans. These 33
 34 women lost their Belgian nationality and were absorbed into the German 34
 35 nation. Because of the nineteenth-century principle of legal unity within the 35

36 36
 37 37

38 ⁷ Ute Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in* 38
 39 *Deutschland* (München, 2001); Luc De Vos, *De smeltkroes, De Belgische krijgsmacht als* 39
 40 *natievormende factor, 1830–1885* (Brussels, 1984). 40

41 ⁸ *Annuaire statistique de la Belgique et du Congo Belge*, 1914, 163. 41

42 ⁹ Hubert Otto, *De la nationalité et de l'Indigénat en Belgique* (Brussels, 1911), 57. 42

1 family, the state reproduced the patriarchal structure of the family and a married 1
2 woman followed the (national) status of her husband.¹⁰ 2
3 This changed at the very end of the nineteenth century when the state 3
4 increased its penetration of society and incrementally 'nationalized' it. Universal 4
5 suffrage democratized politics. Conscription became more generalized in 1903 5
6 when one son per family and, in 1913, all young men were drafted. The first steps 6
7 towards a welfare state were also taken in these years. The expansion of state 7
8 intervention brought an increasing interest in formal membership in the state 8
9 as it identified the bearer of the duties and rights to which the expanding state 9
10 gave rise. The legal tie between the state and the individual acquired a growing 10
11 importance in social life 11

12 The new national order that the state 'imposed' on society was most 12
13 spectacularly expressed in the political sphere: all male Belgians obtained the 13
14 right to vote. Thus, for half of the adult population, the tie between the state 14
15 and the individual became the gateway to political participation. In 1898 15
16 organizations that represented professional interests were given a role in a newly 16
17 designed corporate political economy. However, the board members of these 17
18 organizations had to have Belgian citizenship. Also, leading positions in the 18
19 citizens' militia and the army were now reserved for Belgians, whereas earlier 19
20 foreigners settled in Belgium could be officers.¹¹ 20

21 Disputes over the status of Belgian citizenship rose sharply with the 21
22 democratization of the right to vote. Many people who had considered 22
23 themselves Belgian realized to their amazement that they were in fact aliens. 23
24 Many aliens who had been born in Belgium had neglected to acquire Belgian 24
25 nationality on reaching the age of majority. They thought, erroneously, that 25
26 given their long period of residence in Belgium they were Belgian. Not only they, 26
27 but everyone in their immediate surroundings took these aliens for Belgians. By 27
28 amending the nationality law the legislative power hoped to circumvent disputes 28
29 over citizenship, but this reform took more than a decade. Only in 1909 was the 29
30 acquisition of Belgian nationality radically modified: all aliens born in Belgium 30
31 were automatically bestowed Belgian nationality if their father was also born 31
32 in Belgium. With the double *jus soli* the Belgian nation was now defined less 32
33 ambiguously. The old procedure of nationality acquisition, the mere declaration 33
34 of native birth at age of majority, remained valid for all aliens born in Belgium. 34
35 By 1911 successive amnesties allowed 12,000 aliens born in Belgium, who had 35
36 exceeded the age of majority, to acquire Belgian nationality. Male Belgian-born 36
37 37

38 ¹⁰ Frank Caestecker and Antoon Vrints, 'Getrouwd met de vijand. Hoe na 1918 38
39 Duits-Belgische vrouwen van kamp konden wisselen', *Historica*, 33 (2010), 21–24. 39

40 ¹¹ Frank Caestecker, 'Vluchtelingen en de transformatie van het vreemdelingenbeleid 40
41 in België (1860–1914)', *Belgisch Tijdschrift Nieuwste Geschiedenis*, 40 (2010), 360–364; 41
42 *Journal Militaire Officiel*, 1881, 196. 42

1 foreigners who claimed Belgian nationality through these amnesties had to have 1
 2 registered for the draft. They could become Belgian only if they had shared the 2
 3 burden that came with the holding of nationality.¹² 3

4 The growing popularity of Belgian nationality was an expression of the 4
 5 gradual nationalization of social life. Claiming Belgian citizenship became, for 5
 6 an increasing number of Germans born in Belgium, particularly if they were 6
 7 male, the ticket to Belgian citizenship. Few women who could opt for Belgian 7
 8 nationality did so.¹³ Upon marriage, women still acquired their husband's 8
 9 nationality, thus their own nationality was considered of less importance. 9
 10 Even among the first-generation German immigrants the requests for Belgian 10
 11 citizenship seem to have risen. The rising German–French tensions added to the 11
 12 awareness that to have the nationality of the country where one lived was an 12
 13 advantage. As thirty-year-old Jules Schmalzigaug, whose father had migrated to 13
 14 Belgium in 1866 and who along with his two siblings had been born in Belgium 14
 15 and had claimed Belgian citizenship upon majority, wrote in 1912, 'I want to 15
 16 insist again on the naturalization of father. His rights have to be preserved and 16
 17 it would be good to have the protection of the country where one lives and pays 17
 18 taxes. I mention this because among public opinion here there is considerable 18
 19 irritation on this.'¹⁴ 19

20 Also in the German Empire, the thinking on citizenship had changed by the 20
 21 end of the nineteenth century. The German 1913 Law on the Acquisition and 21
 22 Loss of Imperial and State Citizenship, which ended the automatic loss of German 22
 23 citizenship through absence, was an expression of the rise of ethnic thinking in 23
 24 the German Empire. German citizenship could only be lost by acquiring another 24
 25 citizenship abroad. Germans residing abroad promoted to outposts for cultural 25
 26 and economic expansion were allowed to retain their citizenship indefinitely 26
 27 and transfer it to their descendants. These *Auslanddeutsche*, however, had to 27
 28 perform their military duty in the German army, albeit not the full version. 28
 29 The increasing emphasis on descent was also underlined by making it possible 29
 30 for returning emigrants who had been naturalized elsewhere to regain German 30
 31 citizenship by applying for simplified naturalization. This latter change in 31
 32 32

33 ¹² Frank Caestecker, 'In het kielzog van de Natie-Staat: De Politiek van 33
 34 Nationaliteitsverwerving, verlies en toekenning, 1830–1909', *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor* 34
 35 *Nieuwste Geschiedenis*, 27 (1997), 323–49. 35

36 ¹³ Most of the descendants of a sample of 160 German immigrants who had arrived 36
 37 before 1890 claimed Belgian nationality when they reached the necessary age. Before 37
 38 the outbreak of the war this figure was 76 per cent for male descendants and only 30 38
 39 per cent for female descendants, Caestecker and Vrints, 'German Immigrants and their 39
 40 Families between Scylla and Charybdis'. 40

41 ¹⁴ Museum of Contemporary Art Brussels Archive, Family Schmalzigaug 40
 41 letters 1900–1914, Jules Schmalzigaug to his parents, 1 January 1912; Archives Aliens 41
 42 Department, individual files (henceforth AAD), 698163. 42

1 legislation of the German Empire was presented in Belgium and elsewhere 1
2 as a radical provision for dual citizenship. German legal opposition to dual 2
3 citizenship had, however, prevented all German citizens who emigrated from 3
4 retaining their citizenship. The radical ethno-national agitation leading to the 4
5 German nationality legislation of 1913 was strongly in favour of making all 5
6 German citizens Germans in perpetuity, independent of the acquisition of a new 6
7 citizenship. German legal opposition also insisted on the duty of citizenship. It 7
8 could also convince the German legislative power that it was unacceptable that 8
9 German emigrants could retain their citizenship independent of performing 9
10 military service.¹⁵ 10

11 By 1914 most first-generation Germans remained of German citizenship. 11
12 Just like their fathers, children born in Germany, even if they had spent most of 12
13 their youth in Belgium, rarely applied for naturalization. Like all Germans upon 13
14 majority, they had to fulfill their national duty and serve in the German army. 14
15 However, the male descendants of immigrants from the German Empire born 15
16 in Belgium had claimed Belgian citizenship *en masse* by 1914. The provision of 16
17 *jus soli* for nationality acquisition in Belgian law meant that the descendant of 17
18 a German immigrant who was Belgian-born found it much easier to become 18
19 Belgian than his siblings who were not Belgian-born. 19

20 The social functionality of acquiring citizenship as an expression of national 20
21 identification had been minimal for most of the nineteenth century, but by 21
22 its end Belgian citizenship had acquired some material advantages. Whether 22
23 descendants of German immigrants were increasingly willing to become 23
24 Belgian because of the less heavy citizens' duties or because of the rights they 24
25 obtained is difficult to judge.¹⁶ It may simply express a symbolic need to 25
26 formalize identification with Belgium. Still, German immigrants who retained 26
27 their German nationality despite long-term residence often maintained close 27
28 and diverse connections with Belgium. Participation in ethnic community 28
29 life and/or maintaining contacts with the region of origin indicate that this 29
30 focus on Belgium did not exclude German identification. The combination of 30
31 German, Belgian, and other forms of identification had an almost casual matter- 31
32 of-factness for this population group. That the active German community in 32
33 Belgium was composed of persons having German, Belgian or no citizenship at 33
34 _____ 34

35 ¹⁵ Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschliessen: Die Nationalisierung* 35
36 *der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 36
37 (Göttingen, 2001), 278–329; Eli Nathans, *The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity,* 37
38 *Utility and Nationalism*, (Oxford, 2001), 170–8. 38

39 ¹⁶ According to the German consuls in Brussels and Antwerp, the only reason why 39
40 Germans in Belgium applied for Belgian citizenship was that otherwise they had to perform 40
41 their military service in Germany. Bundesarchiv Berlin [henceforth BA]/R1501/108012, 41
42 Report of German consuls in Brussels and Antwerp to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1910. 41
42 This reasoning does not explain why earlier Germans did not apply for Belgian citizenship. 42

1 all did not, according to the German consul in Antwerp, 'conform to the rules 1
 2 of the national hotheads, but it is in Belgium the historically given situation and 2
 3 its consequences is to the advantage of Germany's national and state interests'.¹⁷ 3
 4 4
 5 5

6 **German Belgians and Belgian Germans at the Outbreak of War** 6 7 7

8 The war was to sweep away the foundations of the social position of Belgian 8
 9 Germans at a single stroke.¹⁸ The combination of German, Belgian and other 9
 10 forms of identification was no longer self-evident. When the Germans invaded 10
 11 Belgium on 4 August 1914, the Belgian military authorities took control of the 11
 12 fortified cities of Antwerp, Namur and Liège. For security reasons all German 12
 13 and Austro-Hungarian nationals who resided in these cities – citizens of enemy 13
 14 nations – were ordered to leave Belgium immediately.¹⁹ The military authorities 14
 15 had been preoccupied with the potential threat to security of the presence of 15
 16 foreigners in the case of war. On 31 July 1914, for example, General Dufour, 16
 17 the military governor of Antwerp, had stressed to the local civilian and military 17
 18 authorities the need to monitor foreigners as there could be spies among them.²⁰ 18
 19 With the proclamation of the state of siege on 6 August, the military authorities 19
 20 acquired far-reaching competences on a nationwide scale. The targeted group 20
 21 of dangerous aliens was expanded: not only all German and Austro-Hungarian 21
 22 citizens but also Belgian citizens who originally had German or Austro- 22
 23 Hungarian nationality had to leave the fortified area by midnight on 6 August.²¹ 23

24 An unknown number of German Belgians, especially those living close to 24
 25 the Dutch border, left Belgium on their own. Others left the country in convoys 25
 26 by train, organized by the Belgian authorities. Some Belgian Germans reported 26
 27 themselves to the Belgian authorities and others were arrested from 6 August 27
 28 onwards. All were interned and interrogated: male Germans of military age 28
 29 remained interned while all other Germans were ordered to leave to the neutral 29
 30 Netherlands in order to await the situation there, or to travel on from there to 30
 31 31

32 ¹⁷ BA/R1501/108012, German consul in Antwerp to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1910. 32

33 ¹⁸ Antoon Vrints, 'De "Klippen des Nationalismus". De Eerste Wereldoorlog en de 33
 34 ondergang van de Duitse kolonie in Antwerpen', *Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis-* 34
 35 *Cabiers d'Histoire du Temps Présent*, 10 (2002), 7–41. 35

36 ¹⁹ As Belgium was not yet at war with Austria-Hungary the latter were not yet enemies. 36

37 ²⁰ City Archives of Antwerp (CAA), MA 3499/1, rapport meeting Dufour, mayor, 37
 38 arrondissement commissioners, general, chief of military intelligence, 31 July 1914; 38
 39 Florence Collard, 'Les manifestations anti-allemandes d'août 1914 en Belgique : évolution 39
 40 de l'opinion publique belge à l'égard des résidents allemands à l'aube de la Grande Guerre' 40
 (unpublished University of Louvain-la-Neuve MA thesis, 2004), 142–3.

41 ²¹ CAA, MA 3499/1, file 119, Declaration Dufour to the Antwerp population, 5 41
 42 September 1914. 42

1 the German or Austro-Hungarian empires. The expulsions occurred on a large 1
2 scale: in the Brussels region at least one third (5100) of the approximately 15,000 2
3 German citizens were interned and expelled to the Netherlands. 3

4 A violent popular pressure added to these Belgian German expulsions.²² 4
5 This outspoken hostility against Germans was entirely new. The hostility in 5
6 August 1914 took an ethno-cultural shape and resulted in ethnic violence on 6
7 a scale unknown in the history of Belgium. Germans were jeered at and their 7
8 possessions were destroyed and plundered. In particular, the visible German 8
9 presence in the form of German bars and shops came under attack.²³ 9

10 From 9 August onwards, popular hostility took another shape. There were 10
11 no longer indiscriminate attacks on Germans and their possessions; rather, 11
12 violence was directed at presumed spies.²⁴ Spy fever had been present from the 12
13 onset of hostilities, but it really gathered steam between 6 and 9 August. Popular 13
14 anger was transformed into popular anxiety. Spy fever, as expressed by thousands 14
15 of denunciations, became the dominant expression of anti-Germanness. 15

16 This shift in popular hostility was concomitant with a more targeted policy. 16
17 The categorical exclusionary policy towards enemy citizens and even Belgians of 17
18 enemy descent was significantly moderated in the second week of August 1914. 18
19 Dichotomous war nationalism pitting Germans against Belgians was questioned 19
20 first at the local level. How exemptions were made is well documented in Antwerp. 20
21 Already on 6 August 1914 the Antwerp local authorities drew up a list of 65 21
22 trustworthy German families recommended by respectable Antwerp citizens.²⁵ 22
23 In the next few days another 22 families were added to the list. These families 23
24 were exempted from forced departure. On 7 August Dufour ordered another 24
25 exception to the collective expulsion of Germans: those German or Austrian 25
26 families with a son in the Belgian army were not to be affected. However, this 26
27 was not a collective amnesty as families with a son in the Belgian army could still 27
28 be expelled on a case by case basis.²⁶ On 7 August the military governor explicitly 28
29 ordered wives and children of enemy citizens to be expelled, except for the 29
30 30

31 ²² On the anti-German riots in 1914: Benoît Majerus, ‘“L’âme de la résistance sort des 31
32 pavés mêmes”? Quelques réflexions sur la manière dont les Bruxellois sont entrés en guerre 32
33 (fin juillet 1914– mi-août 1914)’; and Antoon Vrints, ‘“Moffen buiten!” De anti-Duitse 33
34 rellen in augustus 1914 te Antwerpen’: in Serge Jaumain et al. (eds), *Une guerre totale? La 34
35 Belgique dans la première guerre mondiale. Nouvelles tendances de la recherche historique 35
36* (Brussels, 2005), 33–46 and 47–64. 36

37 ²³ Ö[sterreichisches] S[taatsarchiv], Ministerien des Aussern, Administrative 37
38 Registrateur, F36, Krieg 1914–1918. Departement 7, Kriegreklamationen, Nr.48§, 38
39 declaration witness Albert Plisnier in Brussels in August 1914. 39

40 ²⁴ Jan Van der Fraenen, *Voor den kop geschoten: Executies van Belgische spionnen door de 40
41 Duitse bezetter (1914–1918)* (Roeselare, 2009), 27–45; Collard, *Les manifestations*, 220–64. 41

42 ²⁵ CAA/MA2922/6 B. 42

42 ²⁶ CAA/MA3499/1, file 120, Head of police to Mayor, 7 August 1914. 42

1 children who had obtained Belgian nationality.²⁷ A local policeman, Rousseau, 1
 2 was ordered by the prison director in Antwerp to stop arresting the wives of 2
 3 German men, who, although of German citizenship, were not of German origin. 3
 4 Only the ethnic German women had to leave Belgium. Rousseau got lost in the 4
 5 changing instructions and asked for clear instructions: 'What should we do? First 5
 6 white, then black.'²⁸ His request was heeded. On 9 August General Dufour told 6
 7 the Antwerp mayor to exempt the following categories from expulsion: foreigners 7
 8 born in Belgium younger than 18, foreigners born in Belgium who had done 8
 9 their military duty in Belgium, the stateless (former German) families of the 9
 10 latter foreigners and also German families who had a soldier in the Belgian army. 10
 11 The last group to be exempted was the one originating from Alsace-Lorraine.²⁹ 11
 12 The mayor of Antwerp added the wives of Germans of Belgian origin.³⁰ The next 12
 13 day the Belgian civilian authorities gave new instructions, enlarging the group 13
 14 of trustworthy Germans. The ministers of justice and the interior gave mayors 14
 15 the power to provide temporary residence permits to four categories of Belgian 15
 16 Germans: Germans who had long been established in Belgium and had a good 16
 17 reputation, Germans married with Belgian wives or whose children were born 17
 18 in Belgium, German clerics in established religious communities in Belgium, 18
 19 and German domestic staff of respectable employers.³¹ These categories were 19
 20 sufficiently vague to include a considerable proportion of Belgian Germans. This 20
 21 measure was inspired by the idea that established foreigners, because of their 21
 22 strong links with Belgium, posed no security threat. This policy was thus in line 22
 23 with the Belgian liberal tradition. The position of the political authorities was 23
 24 not at all appreciated by the military authorities: for example, General Dufour, in 24
 25 charge of Antwerp, did not feel bound by these instructions. Consequently, the 25
 26 instructions of 10 August were withdrawn and considered 'non avenue'.³² Still, 26
 27 foreigners born and raised in Belgium who had fulfilled their military duties in 27
 28 Belgium remained exempt and their families, if they were stateless, could stay 28
 29 put. If the family of a Belgian-born foreigner still had German citizenship the 29
 30 litmus test for loyalty was set higher: a son had to serve in the Belgian army. The 30
 31 strong belief in Belgian socialization was not entirely shattered. Also, Belgian 31
 32 Germans could be loyal to Belgium: an explicit legal homogenization was not 32
 33 _____ 33

34 ²⁷ CAA/MA41649, Instructions to the police, 7 August 1914. 34

35 ²⁸ CAA/MA 3499/1, file 120, Rousseau to his superior, 7 August 1914. 35

36 ²⁹ CAA/MA 3499/1, folder 119, Instructions of the police, 9 August 1914; CAA/ 36
 37 MA2922/6 B, Military governor to police, 9 August 1914 (in the latter letter the exemption 37
 38 for Alsace-Lorraine is added in pencil). 38

39 ³⁰ CAA/MA 2922/6 B. 39

40 ³¹ *Recueil des circulaires, instructions et autres actes émanés du Ministère de la Justice ou* 40
relatifs à ce département. Année 1914, 222–3. See also CAA/MA3499/1, folder 119. 40

41 ³² CAA/MA 2922/6 B, Gonne, director of the Sûreté Publique to mayors, 14 41
 42 August 1914. 42

1 mandatory. The military authorities required these Belgian-born foreigners to 1
2 have fulfilled their military duties in Belgium; their being born and raised in 2
3 Belgium did not protect them (and their family) as such from expulsion. Any 3
4 foreigner, born in Belgium or not, who had done his military service abroad and 4
5 thus been exposed to the enemy army, had to leave the country. 5

6 German families who were considered loyal to the host country could stay, 6
7 as could Germans who succeeded in remaining unnoticed as Germans, or who 7
8 were too old to be considered a danger. Belgian Germans, however, who were 8
9 not covered by the supposedly reliable categories had to leave. The men among 9
10 them who might take up arms against Belgium were arrested in August 1914 and 10
11 interned. With the German army approaching, a total of 587 German citizens, 11
12 mostly men of military age, were deported to internment camps in France or 12
13 Great Britain.³³ Although for most of August 1914 the Belgian military and 13
14 especially the political authorities tried to preserve the combination of German, 14
15 Belgian and other forms of identification as an acceptable way of being part of 15
16 the Belgian community, this was no longer self-evident. 16

17
18

19 **Belgian Germans, German Belgians and the Belgian Nation during the War** 19

20
21 In spite of the anti-German climate in invaded Belgium, many German 21
22 Belgians, even as spies and soldiers, sided with Belgium during the invasion and 22
23 occupation. Two intertwined categories of factors may have been the basis for 23
24 opting for Belgium. First, there was sincere moral indignation about the German 24
25 invasion. On the day of the invasion, the Brussels correspondent of the *Deutsche* 25
26 *Wochenzeitung für die Niederlande und Belgien*, Paul Düna, sent a report to 26
27 the neutral Netherlands suggesting under the title 'Hated, feared and no longer 27
28 respected!' that German Belgians or Belgian Germans' feelings were clearly anti- 28
29 German. 'If it had not been the highest German authorities who had declared 29
30 war on Belgium, they (the Germans in Belgium) would not have believed it ... 30
31 This country ... a nation of honour ... has always granted the fullest hospitality 31
32 to the Germans.'³⁴ Second, there were naturally relationships and ties that the 32
33 often long years of living in Belgium had generated. These were translated into 33
34 an attitude of solidarity with Belgian social groups to which these immigrants 34
35 and their families had started to belong. In this case interweaving with Belgian 35
36 society ran so deep that a future outside it was beyond imagination. Numerous 36

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39 ³³ Mathy De Spiegeleir, 'Vijand en vreemdeling. Duitse immigranten en hun 38
40 nakomelingen tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog: Proposografische studie gericht op Duitsers 39
41 die in 1914 werden opgepakt en geïnterneerd' (unpublished University of Ghent MA 40
42 thesis, 2007). 41

42 ³⁴ *Deutsche Wochenzeitung für die Niederlande und Belgien*, 9 August 1914. 42

1 sons of immigrants from the German Empire – in particular those who had 1
 2 become Belgian by option on reaching adulthood and whose mothers were ex- 2
 3 Belgian – reported as volunteers for the Belgian army (or had been mobilized).³⁵ 3
 4 Those Belgian Germans who were born and bred in Belgium but did not opt 4
 5 for Belgian nationality were less likely to serve in the Belgian army; however, 5
 6 in the period 1915–17 their participation in the Belgian army increased. This 6
 7 rise in the number of Belgian-born Germans serving in the Belgian army is 7
 8 particularly remarkable since the Belgian army responded to their willingness 8
 9 to serve with distrust. 9

10 Already in September 1914 the presence of soldiers of German descent was 10
 11 considered a problem by the army command. The army decided that all sons 11
 12 of Germans and Austrians were to be removed from the army, a decision to be 12
 13 repeated in February 1915. They all had to be put in a special *Compagnie de* 13
 14 *suspects* in the camp of Ruchard, but it seems that resistance was strong and the 14
 15 decision was not implemented. Very few Belgian Germans or German Belgians 15
 16 were indeed removed from the front.³⁶ However, in January 1916 the authorities 16
 17 became adamant about enforcing their decision. The military security ordered 17
 18 every army unit to draw up a reliability report on every soldier who was the son 18
 19 of Germans. Because of their (presumed) unreliability, but mostly purely because 19
 20 of their origin, they were taken from their units at the front and incorporated 20
 21 into specially guarded platoons. Those Belgian-born soldiers who had claimed 21
 22 Belgian nationality upon majority contacted their municipal administration 22
 23 in occupied Belgium, directly or indirectly, to prove their pro-Belgian choice.³⁷ 23
 24 Formal citizenship did not protect them against distrust; even Belgian soldiers 24
 25 with a German mother were collectively considered unreliable.³⁸ 25

26 At the end of 1917 there were at least 447 soldiers in these platoons who 26
 27 were sons of Austrians and Germans.³⁹ The unreliability of these soldiers was 27
 28 not sufficiently substantiated to summon them to court-martial or incorporate 28
 29 them in a penal company. During the period of internment, information was 29
 30 30

31 ³⁵ Among a representative sample of 23 male second-generation German immigrants 31
 32 born in Belgium between 1896 and 1884 and randomly selected on their parents' years 32
 33 of arrival in Belgium (1883–1884), 13 per cent were in the Belgian army between 1914 33
 34 and 1916. Caestecker and Vrints, 'German Immigrants and their Families between Scylla 34
 35 and Charybdis'. 35

36 ³⁶ Army Museum (Brussels), Russian Archive [henceforth AMBRA], box 1663, 36
 37 folder 185-14-4839 (1968), Chef de Cabinet of the Minister of War to Inspecteur Général 37
 38 de l'Armée, 9 June 1916 and his undated reply. 38

39 ³⁷ AMBRA, box 1663, folder 185-14-4091, Baron Fallon to Baron Beyens, 25 39
 40 May 1916. 40

41 ³⁸ Dorval Lucien, an indigenous Belgian, was even checked by the military security 41
 42 because his brother-in-law was an Austrian. AMBRA, box 1663, folder 185-14-4091. 41

42 ³⁹ AMBRA, box 1663, folder 185-14-4091. 42

1 gathered on their contacts with relatives, friends, business acquaintances in the 1
2 German Empire and, in particular, on whether they had acquaintances serving 2
3 in the Germany army. Also investigated was whether the relatives remaining in 3
4 Belgium served the occupier.⁴⁰ The military security used an ethnic definition of 4
5 Germanness, so Poles were exempted from this disciplinary treatment. 5

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8 **The German Occupation** 8

9

10 When in the autumn of 1914 the German armies came to a standstill at the 10
11 Western front that was to remain for years, virtually all of Belgium was occupied. 11
12 Under the occupation the German authorities appropriated and mobilized the 12
13 Belgian Germans for both short-term pragmatic considerations and long-term 13
14 strategic and ideological goals. In the short term, the mobilization of Belgian 14
15 Germans contributed to the war effort. Already by February 1915 the occupier 15
16 had directly involved the Belgian Germans in this effort. All male Germans 16
17 between 17 and 45 years old and considered medically fit had to serve in the 17
18 German army. In the following years many more Germans had to serve in the 18
19 German army as the medical selection became much milder and ever older men 19
20 were called up.⁴¹ To evade military service in the German army, and probably 20
21 also as a protest against the German occupation, young Belgian-born Germans 21
22 in occupied Belgium claimed Belgian citizenship when they reached the age of 22
23 majority. In October 1915 the German governor-general decreed that citizens 23
24 of the German Empire and its allied states could no longer apply for or claim 24
25 Belgian citizenship.⁴² 25

26 The occupier wanted to even widen the target group of potential conscripts 26
27 beyond those of German citizenship. In the summer of 1916, a number of young 27
28 Belgian men of German descent were drafted. The occupier claimed them to be 28
29 German citizens as well. The German authorities justified the enlistment of the 29
30 stateless, but also of German Belgians by referring to the German nationality 30
31 law of 1913 which, according to their interpretation, only stripped those 31
32 German nationals of their German nationality if they had deliberately chosen 32
33 another nationality. Their Belgian nationality based on the double *jus soli* 33

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35 ⁴⁰ AMBRA, box 1663, folder 185-14-4091. 35

36 ⁴¹ Sammlung der Bekanntmachungen und Verordnungen der deutschen Behörden 36
37 in Antwerpen, nr. 5,, 86, 17 February 1915; *Les avis, proclamations & nouvelles de* 37
38 *guerre allemands affichés à Bruxelles pendant l'occupation du 5 juin au 1er Août 1915* 38
39 (Elsene, n.d.), 19–21. ÖS, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHSTa), Konsulatsarchiv 39
40 Antwerp 1905–1918.

41 ⁴² Verordnung Generalgouverneur in Belgien, 21 October 1915, *Gesetz- und* 40
41 *Verordnungsblatt für die okkupierte Gebiete Belgiens* (henceforth *GVOGB*), nr.133, 16 41
42 October 1915. 42

1 probably was not considered a voluntary decision by the German authorities. 1
 2 As Belgian nationality had been imposed on them and as they had never asked 2
 3 to be discharged of their German citizenship, they were considered to still be 3
 4 Germans by the German authorities. 4

5 This decision provoked harsh protests; a letter from four Belgian bishops and 5
 6 a petition of members of the judiciary and the political establishment retorted 6
 7 that those ‘by Belgium adopted sons’ were an integral part of the Belgian 7
 8 community. Due to these protests the mobilization of German Belgians was 8
 9 at least temporarily suspended.⁴³ Although Belgians were no longer mobilized 9
 10 by the German military, the mobilization of stateless people continued since 10
 11 the German authorities held that the German nationality law of 1913 provided 11
 12 for only an active manner of losing German citizenship.⁴⁴ The occupier made 12
 13 grateful use of the knowledge of the German immigrants and their offspring of 13
 14 the terrain, including their knowledge of Dutch and French. Belgian Germans 14
 15 became involved in the administration and in the police forces in occupied 15
 16 Belgium. This way they could escape conscription into the German army. 16

17 The German communities in Belgium were also considered of importance for 17
 18 ideological expansionist reasons. However divergent the ideas might have been 18
 19 on the future of Belgium, a strong position of Germanness in Belgium was also 19
 20 considered in the German national interest. The German authorities therefore 20
 21 stimulated the return of Belgian Germans who had fled Belgium in 1914.⁴⁵ 21
 22 In the restrictive regulations on mobility in and to occupied Belgium, they 22
 23 obtained an exceptional status. However, the occupation authorities apparently 23
 24 feared becoming saddled with additional burdens, for they only stimulated 24
 25 the return of those who could provide for themselves. In Berlin, the *Berliner* 25
 26 *Hilfsverein für die aus Belgien vertriebenen Deutsche* was established. With the 26
 27 support of the German authorities in Belgium, this association organized study 27
 28 trips to the occupied areas to persuade the refugees to return. Positive reports 28
 29 were published in the German press to reinforce the message. 29

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33 ⁴³ Jacques Pirenne and Marcel Vauthier, *La législation et l'administration allemandes* 33
 34 *en Belgique* (Paris, 1925), 144 ; Fernand Mayence, *La correspondance de S.E. le Cardinal* 34
 35 *Mercier avec le Gouvernement Général allemand pendant l'occupation 1914–1918* 35
 36 (Brussels and Paris, 1919), 195. 36

37 ⁴⁴ Jules de Thier and Olympe Gilbert, *Liège pendant la Grande Guerre*, IV 37
 38 (Liège, 1919), 112. 38

39 ⁴⁵ National Archives Brussels, Archives de la Commission d'enquête sur la violation 39
 40 des règles du droit des gens, des lois et des coutumes de la guerre (1914–1926), nr. 43; *Reports* 39
 41 *on the attitude of the German press vis-à-vis the German community in Belgium, 1914–1918:* 40
 42 *Deutsche Wochenzeitung für die Niederlande und Belgien*, 6 February 1916; *Verordnung* 41
 42 *Generalgouverneur in Belgien*, 1 July 1915, *GVOGB*, nr. 111, 31 August 1915. 42

1 The government-general left no stone unturned to ensure the future of 1
2 Germans in Belgium.⁴⁶ The legal rights of Belgian Germans were indemnified 2
3 and they could obtain, if they had suffered severe economic damage, 3
4 postponement or some cancellation of Belgian direct taxes.⁴⁷ In addition, the 4
5 German occupier established German *Schiedsgerichte* based on Napoleonic 5
6 legislation to force the local authorities to pay compensation for the damage 6
7 caused by the anti-German actions of August 1914.⁴⁸ The Belgian municipalities 7
8 refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of those courts, but were in fact forced to 8
9 pay the compensation decided by the *Schiedsgericht*. A considerable proportion 9
10 of Belgian Germans took advantage of this option. Just for the city of Antwerp 10
11 with its 8346 inhabitants of German nationality in 1910, 863 applications were 11
12 made during the course of the occupation, often with several individuals being 12
13 involved in a single appeal.⁴⁹ The occupier also set himself up as protector of the 13
14 physical and moral integrity of Belgian Germans; those who in any way harmed 14
15 Germans risked severe prison sentences and financial penalties, imposed by 15
16 German military law courts.⁵⁰ 16

17 On a material level Belgian Germans benefited from some privileges (such 17
18 as free public transport or additional provisions) frequently provided via the 18
19 appropriated German associations, which in the context of scarcity in the 19
20 occupied country were of great importance. The occupier reserved Belgian 20
21 game for German officers, but Belgian Germans were also awarded hunting 21
22 permits.⁵¹ Undoubtedly, such privileges stirred up much bad blood among the 22
23 impoverished population of the occupied country. 23

24 The occupation government also developed a cultural policy aimed at 24
25 maximizing the influence of Germanness in Belgium in the longer term whatever 25

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29 ⁴⁶ Studie en documentatiecentrum Oorlog en Hedendaagse Maatschappij, 29
30 AB 1720, *Erinnerungen aus dem Weltkrieg 1914–1918 des Generaloberst Ludwig von* 30
31 *Falkenhausen*, 239–241; Ludwig von Köhler, *Die Staatsverwaltung der besetzten Gebiete:* 31
32 *Belgien* (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, 1927), 173–7. 32

33 ⁴⁷ Respectively Verordnung Generalgouverneur in Belgien, 10 November 1914 33
34 and 16 January 1915, *GVOGB*. 34

35 ⁴⁸ Verordnung Generalgouverneur in Belgien, 3 February 1915, *GVOGB*, nr. 37, 9 35
36 February 1915. 36

37 ⁴⁹ CAA/MA2279–2322; ÖS, Ministerien des Aussern, Administrative 37
38 Registrateur, F36, Krieg 1914–1918. Departement 7, Kriegsreklamationen, 38
39 nr. 485, 486, 488. 39

40 ⁵⁰ Verordnung Generalgouverneur in Belgien, 4 September 1915, *GVOGB*, nr. 113, 11 40
41 September 1915. 41

42 ⁵¹ Verordnung Generalgouverneur in Belgien, 11 August 1915, *GVOGB*, nr. 110, 28 42
43 August 1915. 43

1 the post war political status of the Belgian territories might be.⁵² Not only did 1
 2 the occupier want to exploit Belgium economically and master it politically, but 2
 3 he also wanted to reshape it culturally. The German cultural policy in Belgium 3
 4 was directed mainly at German immigrants and their families. The occupier 4
 5 went to great lengths to resuscitate German social life. As a result of this policy, 5
 6 German immigrant organizations in Belgium became completely entangled 6
 7 with the occupier. From the strategic consideration that those who are young 7
 8 hold the future, the occupier focused his efforts on education. Pre-war German 8
 9 schools were re-opened; in 1918 the German school in Brussels reached its 9
 10 highest-ever number of pupils (818), nearly exclusively Germans, and new 10
 11 German schools were founded.⁵³ The expansion of German education during 11
 12 the occupation was mainly aimed at the German labour population, which had 12
 13 been sending its children to the free Belgian schools and had hardly attended the 13
 14 pre-war German elite schools. In order to attract pupils, the children attending 14
 15 these schools received material benefits, such as free public transport, hot meals 15
 16 at lunchtime, and holiday stays. To be able to Germanize children of German 16
 17 descent who had been alienated from their origin due to domicile in Belgium, 17
 18 some German schools organized preparatory classes in French to teach the 18
 19 children basic German. Children from mixed Belgian-German couples were 19
 20 also targeted. This Germanization campaign established (residential) youth 20
 21 clubs for them. 21

22 With regard to various forms of mobilization of the Belgian Germans, it was 22
 23 of great importance to the occupier to get a precise view of this group. In fact, the 23
 24 occupier's policy towards the Belgian Germans seems to have radicalized during 24
 25 the second half of the occupation. Whereas in September 1917 only German 25
 26 citizens (over 14 years of age) had to report for a census, in December 1917 the 26
 27 governor-general decreed that all those of German origin, including the stateless 27
 28 who had been German or whose father was of German origin, had to report 28
 29 to a *Passbureau* in their municipality in the four weeks after 13 January 1918.⁵⁴ 29
 30 All these people of German origin had to report their movements to the 30
 31 German authorities. 31

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 34 ⁵² Alfred Geiser, 'Deutsche Kulturpolitik im besetzten Belgien', *Das Deutschtum im* 34
 35 *Ausland*, 34 (1917), 301–3. 35

36 ⁵³ *Deutsche Volksschule in Lüttich: Bericht über die drei ersten Schul-* 36
 37 *jahre 1915–1916, 1916–1917, 1917–1918* (Brussels, 1918); Vanwildemeersch, *Van* 37
 38 *Unserem lieben König*, 58. 38

39 ⁵⁴ Bekanntmachung Generalgouverneur in Belgien, 13 December 1917, *Gesetz-* 39
 40 *und Verordnungsblatt für Flandern*, nr. 2, 5 January 1918. In September 1917 the 40
 41 occupier proclaimed also that all men between 15 and 47 of German descent, but who 41
 42 had become stateless or had Belgian citizenship, had to register for military service. de 42
 Thier and Gilbert, *Liège pendant la Grande Guerre*, 112.

1 This strategy of appropriation and mobilization of the Belgian Germans was 1
2 fruitful as a number of factors pushed the Belgian Germans into playing the 2
3 German card. In the first place, there was the bitterness about the anti-German 3
4 actions and expulsion at the beginning of August 1914 and perhaps principally 4
5 about the havoc they found on their return to Belgium. In many cases, the direct 5
6 experience with anti-German violence was likely to be a powerful stimulus for 6
7 German national identification. A second factor was the wall of distrust they 7
8 encountered from their Belgian neighbours, colleagues, and acquaintances.⁵⁵ 8
9 The resistance press identified them with the hated occupier, and this 9
10 perception was undoubtedly shared by broad layers of the Belgian population. 10
11 In a September 1915 ordinance, the German governor-general reported threats, 11
12 blacklists, and boycott actions against them.⁵⁶ Often they could no longer count 12
13 on their former contacts so that, from sheer necessity, a number of them sought 13
14 support from the occupying power. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, 14
15 there were economic considerations. In the short term, cooperation with the 15
16 occupier offered opportunities to get hold of additional food or to make a profit. 16
17 It must have been a tempting perspective in the difficult economic circumstances 17
18 that characterized occupied Belgium. It could be for bare survival that Belgian 18
19 German white collar workers who had become unemployed because of the 19
20 stagnation of the Belgian economy ended up joining the German police forces. 20
21 Others saw it as a profitable enterprise. In the longer term, if the Germans won, 21
22 Belgium was to be positioned in the sphere of influence of the empire or perhaps 22
23 even be annexed by Germany. In such a scenario, Belgian-German businessmen 23
24 would end up at an exquisite point of departure. 24

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26

27 **Post-War Expulsion: 'Heraus!'** 27
28 28

29 The mobilization and privileging of Belgian Germans by the occupier heavily 29
30 discredited their position in the eyes of the Belgian population and authorities. 30
31 During the war the Belgian government in exile started preparing repressive 31
32 measures against them. The first measure was to make adopting Belgian 32
33 nationality impossible for Germans. In February 1916, the possibility for 33
34 Germans to become Belgians was blocked.⁵⁷ Enemy elements did not only have 34
35 to be prevented from entering the nation, those who had already infiltrated 35
36 the nation had to be excluded from the nation. Notably, the fact that German 36
37 Belgians were fighting in the German army caused an early uproar in the Belgian 37
38 38

39 ⁵⁵ *Kölnische Zeitung*, 29 May 1915. 39

40 ⁵⁶ Verordnung Generalgouverneur in Belgien, 4 September 1915, *GVOGB*, nr. 113, 11 40
41 September 1915. 41

42 ⁵⁷ Parliamentary Documents Chamber, 1919–1920, nr. 422 (2 October 1919) 42

1 government in exile. The socialist Emile Vandervelde denounced the treacherous 1
 2 action of German Belgians in the Council of Ministers of 14 October 1916 and 2
 3 insisted that after the war the courts should acquire the power to take action 3
 4 against them. 4

5 After the German collapse the vast majority of Belgian Germans realized 5
 6 that their position had become impossible and left with the help of the occupier 6
 7 in the wake of the German army's retreat. With the liberation of Belgium, 7
 8 the departure of Belgian Germans became extremely difficult as means of 8
 9 transportation were scarce and by the end of 1918 Allied-occupied Germany 9
 10 was even closed for them. Belgian military security actually feared that these 10
 11 returning Belgian Germans would reinforce the enemy. Belgian Germans 11
 12 could only return to the non-occupied part of Germany via the Netherlands. 12
 13 This required a passport, and it was only in early 1919 that German citizens 13
 14 could acquire a passport through the Spanish and Dutch consular authorities 14
 15 in Brussels. Only some well-to-do Germans were able to leave Belgium on a 15
 16 'voluntary' basis and at their own expense to the Netherlands. Some Germans 16
 17 stayed in the Netherlands hoping for better times, others returned to Germany. 17
 18 The 'voluntary' leavers were mainly first-generation immigrants; very few sons 18
 19 and daughters of immigrants, even if they still had German citizenship, left 19
 20 Belgium voluntarily. Most undesirable Germans were forced to wait in Belgium 20
 21 because they did not have sufficient resources to undertake this journey.⁵⁸ 21

22 22
 23 23

24 **The Internment of Germans** 24 25 25

26 An exceptional Aliens Act for wartime – the Royal Decree of 12 October 1918 – 26
 27 gave the minister of justice Emile Vandervelde absolute power over foreigners, 27
 28 but also over Belgians who were born as (enemy) aliens. Denying equal rights 28
 29 to the Belgians who had acquired Belgian nationality when they had reached 29
 30 adulthood on the basis of having been born in Belgium meant a radical breach 30
 31 with the nineteenth-century liberal ideas. These Belgians were demoted to 31
 32 second-rate Belgians, just as the naturalized Belgians had always been. Together 32
 33 with all foreigners these 'inferior' Belgians had to report to the local authorities. 33
 34 About 30,000 individuals reported. 34

35 The Belgian authorities set out a clear policy line. German and Austro- 35
 36 Hungarian citizens who reported to the local authorities were collectively 36
 37 37
 38 38
 39 39

40 ⁵⁸ Frank Caestecker, 'Wie was nu de vijand? De constructie van de "Duitser" bij 40
 41 het aflijnen van ongewenste vreemdelingen (1918–1919)' in Serge Jaumain et al. (eds), 41
 42 *Une Guerre totale?* (Brussels, 2005), 519–31. 42

1 exhorted to leave the country voluntarily.⁵⁹ Every German and Austro-Hungarian 1
2 citizen who had served in an enemy army or had cooperated with the occupation 2
3 government, even if forced to do so, or had left the service before the end of the 3
4 war, was interned with a view to expulsion. In Brussels alone 1051 citizens of 4
5 German origin were interned.⁶⁰ In January 1919, as prisons became overcrowded, 5
6 many Belgian-German detainees were transferred to an internment camp in 6
7 Adinkerke. The detention of the Germans and the attempt to force them out 7
8 voluntarily were emergency solutions, since these undesirable aliens could not 8
9 yet be expelled to Germany.⁶¹ 9

10 In Belgian society, aversion to the Germans who were not leaving the liberated 10
11 country was on the increase. A black-and-white view was shared by broad layers 11
12 of society; while intellectual and economic circles also joined this radical anti- 12
13 German mood. For example, all Germans were excluded from the Antwerp 13
14 Chamber of Commerce and from freemasonry as well.⁶² Interethnic relations 14
15 became very strained, resulting in anti-German associations, manifestations, 15
16 and violence. 16

17 Because of the severe pressure from below, Vandervelde felt obliged to exert 17
18 more pressure on the Belgian Germans to leave the country. A more active policy 18
19 was to make it clear to a population bent on vengeance that the government 19
20 only tolerated Germans until their deportation could be executed. On 11 20
21 January 1919 the minister of justice issued instructions to local authorities to 21
22 increase their grip on undesirable aliens. They received the order to summon 22
23 every male citizen of German or Austro-Hungarian nationality between 16 23
24 and 60 years of age twice a week to a local control office. Individuals who had 24
25 apparently lost their original German or Austro-Hungarian nationality and 25
26 were declared to be stateless had to be summoned as well. Many municipalities 26
27 decided to insert German nationality on the identity cards of these stateless 27
28 people of German descent. The district commissioner of Verviers complained 28
29 that even 'parents of soldiers who have made the war in our ranks saw German 29
30 citizenship inflicted on them.'⁶³ 30

31 _____ 31
32 ⁵⁹ Nationality of an enemy country referred to the Central Powers: Turkey, Bulgaria, 32
33 Austria-Hungary and the German Empire, but the Bulgarian and Turkish citizens had 33
34 the benefit of the doubt. Only if the local police or the state police had information on 34
35 a benevolent attitude towards the occupier were they interned and exiled. AAD, 214, 35
36 Vandervelde, Note pour la Sûreté Publique, 26 March 1919. 36

37 ⁶⁰ Parliamentary Proceedings Senate (henceforth PPS), 27 December 1918. 37

38 ⁶¹ Caestecker, 'Wie was nu de vijand?'. 38

39 ⁶² *Annuaire de la Chambre de Commerce d'Anvers 1871-1926* (Antwerp, 1927), 116; 39
40 Roger Grignard, 'De Duitse maçonnieke aanwezigheid in België', *Jaarboek Studiekring* 40
41 *vzw Trigonum coronatum*, 4 (1996), 76-96. 40

42 ⁶³ *Rapport de M. le commissaire d'arrondissement de Verviers : Annexes à l'Exposé de la* 41
42 *situation administrative de la province de Liège* (Verviers, 1921), 33. 42

1 This reporting obligation, twice a week, was envisaged as obtaining an up- 1
 2 to-date overview of the individuals who were liable for expulsion. In this way, 2
 3 they could be removed rapidly as soon as it was materially possible. At the 3
 4 same time, Vandervelde appealed to the local authorities to arrest all suspect 4
 5 foreigners. German and Austro-Hungarian citizens who avoided the control 5
 6 were considered to be suspect by definition. Citizens of enemy states who had 6
 7 served in the enemy army, cooperated with the German political police, traded 7
 8 with the enemy, or had been involved in the occupation administration had 8
 9 to be interned as well. Women who served in the occupation administration 9
 10 should not be spared arrest. 10

11 Local authorities enthusiastically applied the measure to check all enemy 11
 12 citizens. In greater Brussels, not only men but also women had to report twice 12
 13 a week.⁶⁴ However, the number of arrests by local authorities was minimal. The 13
 14 sharp discrepancy between the enthusiasm of the local authorities in early 1919 14
 15 for controlling the enemy and the small number of arrests can only indicate the 15
 16 neutral attitude during the occupation of many of these Belgian Germans still in 16
 17 Belgium. Apparently, apart from having the nationality of an enemy state, these 17
 18 Germans could not be accused of anything else. Those who were most tainted 18
 19 had probably already fled at the time of the armistice. 19

20 The repression by the Belgian state immediately after liberation was mainly 20
 21 aimed at male German immigrants of the first generation. Spouses and children 21
 22 were far less affected in the arrest wave of the first few months, which indicates 22
 23 that they were apparently considered to be less of a threat. In individual cases 23
 24 the revenge against anything German led to vigorous action. The administrative 24
 25 decisions on arrest as well as expulsion were highly arbitrary and no appeal was 25
 26 possible. The rushed and ill-considered way of working is strikingly illustrated 26
 27 by the arrest or even expulsion of Belgians. The three Belgian brothers S – 27
 28 born in Belgium but of German descent – were interned because they ‘had not 28
 29 yet completed their military obligations’ and had worked for the occupier. 29
 30 However, they denied the latter most emphatically and, moreover, stated that 30
 31 they had never been in contact with the German occupier. They could not count 31
 32 on any clemency. In the spring of 1919 they were, together with 300 Germans, 32
 33 collectively repatriated to Germany in an operation organized by the Belgian 33
 34 and Dutch authorities. Belgians of German origin who had been disloyal to their 34
 35 new nation were singled out for the most severe punishment a state could inflict 35
 36 upon a national: the banishment from the nation. Originally, the government 36
 37 had provided for the possibility of punishing Belgian collaborators, regardless of 37
 38 the origin of their nationality, by revoking their nationality. However, Belgians 38
 39 by descent were spared this far-reaching punishment. In the final version of the 39

40
 41 ⁶⁴ AAD, 214, Note concernant l’exécution des instructions contenues dans les dépêches 41
 42 de Monsieur le Ministre, 11 January 1919. 42

1 law, only Belgians of foreign origin were targeted. In particular, the German 1
2 Belgians were the focus of this punishment; although legally Belgians, they 2
3 were considered because of 'their Germanic blood that flows in their veins' to 3
4 be part of the German race.⁶⁵ Similar to the aforementioned Royal Decree of 12 4
5 October 1918, for the first time a fundamental difference was made between 5
6 Belgians by birth or naturalization, and Belgians by descent. Not all Belgians 6
7 were equal before the law; the punishment for collaboration by 'new' Belgians 7
8 was much more severe. The so-called naive thrust of the legislature in 1909 8
9 had to be remedied. Between 1918 and 1929, the lower courts pronounced 73 9
10 verdicts of denationalization, of which 60 were Belgians of German origin, 10
11 mostly born in Belgium.⁶⁶ 11

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14 **The Good Germans: New Allies and Loyal Belgian Germans** 14 15 15

16 Notwithstanding concessions to the hardliners, Vandervelde pleaded for a 16
17 nuanced policy vis-à-vis Belgian Germans. In this respect, the Catholic church 17
18 was an important ally. The head of the Roman Catholic church in Belgium, 18
19 Cardinal Désiré Mercier, rejected blind revenge on the Belgian Germans as 19
20 repression innate in barbaric regimes. He pleaded for a repressive policy that 20
21 would only affect the guilty. The attitude of the dominant Roman Catholic 21
22 church was important support for Vandervelde. Cardinal Mercier had acquired 22
23 an aura of respect because of his resistance to the occupation, and thus 23
24 Vandervelde was then able to make a stand for Belgian Germans without risking 24
25 the label of unpatriotic.⁶⁷ 25

26 At the beginning of 1919 some citizens of the multinational empires 26
27 in Central Europe were no longer called enemies. The Versailles treaty that 27
28 honoured the right to self-determination and divided the Central European 28
29 empires into nation states resulted in the collective debt of citizens of the enemy 29
30 states being limited to those who were alleged to belong to the core of these 30
31 states. The inhabitants of Eupen-Malmédy, the Alsatians and Lorrainians, the 31
32 Austrian Italians, the Danish from North Schleswig, the Rumanians from 32
33 Transylvania-Bucovina, the Greeks from Bulgaria, the Syrians, the Poles, the 33
34 Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs were thus turned into allies, even though during 34
35 the war they had been citizens of enemy states. 35

36 The Belgian policy regarding enemies living in Belgium was profoundly 36
37 changed by this new geopolitical reality. The transfer from enemy to friendly 37
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39 ⁶⁵ PPS, 17 November 1919, 151. 39

40 ⁶⁶ Théodor Heyse, 'La pénétration allemande en Belgique', *Revue belge des livres,* 40
41 *documents et archives de la guerre 1814–1918* (1930), 341. 41

42 ⁶⁷ Caestecker, 'Wie was nu de vijand?', 527–8. 42

1 alien was not always that straightforward. In certain cases private committees 1
 2 determined who belonged to these groups and they stated that political loyalty 2
 3 during the war was a criterion in assessing the affiliation of an individual. The 3
 4 Belgian authorities also had a say in this operation and it seems no blank cheque 4
 5 was given. The fact that these allies had joined the enemy army or the occupation 5
 6 administration was mostly glossed over. In spite of themselves, these individuals 6
 7 had been citizens of the Central Powers and had not been able to back out of 7
 8 their incorporation by force into the armed forces of the Central Powers. Their 8
 9 activities during the occupation were minimized because they had belonged to 9
 10 a friendly nation, albeit only virtually. Therefore nothing impeded continued 10
 11 residence in Belgium. 11

12 Even among those who remained associated with enemy nations, Vandervelde 12
 13 decided not to oppose the presence in the country of those who had a loyal or 13
 14 neutral attitude during the war. Vandervelde identified four groups to exempt 14
 15 from expulsion: First of all, members of religious orders who provided care, as 15
 16 well as members of closed orders. Secondly, German domestic servants who had 16
 17 resided in Belgium for a long time and who were too old to still earn a living 17
 18 elsewhere or whose care was necessary for older individuals. Thirdly, German 18
 19 women of Belgian origin. These women, who had lost Belgian nationality due 19
 20 to their marriage to a German or Austro-Hungarian citizen, could count on 20
 21 clemency, but only if they were widows or had been separated or legally divorced. 21
 22 Only these former Belgians could be exempted from expulsion. A last group 22
 23 which could be tolerated in Belgium was Germans born in Belgium or who had 23
 24 been residing in Belgium for a long time and who did not have any relationship 24
 25 with their country of origin. Among them Vandervelde also considered German 25
 26 and Austro-Hungarian citizens who had supplied services to the Allied forces 26
 27 or whose sons had fought in the Belgian army. The four groups of trustworthy 27
 28 Germans which Vandervelde enumerated were almost the same ones as the 28
 29 Belgian civilian authorities had listed on 10 August 1914. Still, Vandervelde's list 29
 30 was defined more strictly. For example, the German husbands of Belgian wives 30
 31 were no longer considered loyal to Belgium. Only the women could remain in 31
 32 Belgium, and this under the condition that they had divorced their German 32
 33 husbands. Due to the war experience *prima facie* loyalty became reserved to a 33
 34 much more strictly defined group.⁶⁸ 34

35 Not only Belgian Germans in Belgium applied for an exception to the 35
 36 expulsion rule but also Belgian Germans who found themselves outside of 36
 37 Belgium applied for repatriation by evoking their loyal attitude towards 37
 38 Belgium. Numerous Belgian Germans who had fled Belgium at the time of the 38
 39 liberation or even those of military age who had been interned for the whole war 39
 40 period in France in 1914 submitted a request to return after they had been sent 40

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 42 ⁶⁸ Caestecker, *ibid.*, 528–9. 42

1 back to Germany or had fled to the Netherlands or Germany. From Germany 1
 2 they urged the Belgian authorities to be allowed to return to Belgium. The three 2
 3 brothers S., Belgians of German descent who were expelled in early 1919, could 3
 4 thus prove their Belgian nationality from Germany. In this way they were able 4
 5 to exact their return.⁶⁹ The gradual moderation of state policy towards Belgian 5
 6 Germans had only a limited influence on the restoration of the Belgian-German 6
 7 community. The census of December 1920 indicated that, at most, 25 per cent 7
 8 of the pre-war population which had been citizens of the German Empire or the 8
 9 Austro-Hungarian monarchy remained in Belgium. 9

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 11 Table 6.2 Number of Inhabitants in Belgium of Foreign, German and 11
 12 Austrian Nationality 12

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	Foreigners	German Empire	Austro-Hungaria	Czechoslovakia	Poland
16 1910	254,547	57,010	5927		
17 1920	149,677	7960	714 (A)+ 215 (H)	712	5329

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 19
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21 **Conclusion** 21

22
 23 For Belgium as a liberal regime the war experience dramatically changed the 23
 24 perception of German immigrants and their descendants. In nineteenth-century 24
 25 Belgium the dominant liberal view perceived immigrants and their descendants 25
 26 as emigrants who over time became more attached to the country of their 26
 27 choice than to the country which they left. The descendants of immigrants born 27
 28 and raised in Belgium were considered fully fledged members of the Belgian 28
 29 national community. By the end of the nineteenth century these foreigners 29
 30 were increasingly offered the opportunity and even forced to become Belgian. 30
 31 Socially belonging to Belgian society was also increasingly sealed by legally 31
 32 becoming members of the nation. 32

33 By the start of the war in August 1914, a radical change can be discerned 33
 34 within the state policy of excluding all Belgian Germans, albeit with considerable 34
 35 hesitation. The impact of national identification took on an urgency previously 35
 36 unknown. From 1916 the Belgian authorities departed from this selection on 36
 37 the basis of citizenship and their mere ethnic origin made all Germans, including 37
 38 the German Belgians, suspicious. In both cases popular pressure added to this 38
 39 radicalization. The decision-making of the Belgian authorities was at least partly 39
 40 a response to the instrumentalization and mobilization of Belgian Germans, 40

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 42 ⁶⁹ AAD, 383 701. 42

1 the stateless of German origin and even some German Belgians by the occupier. 1
 2 As would be the case in Eastern Europe after the Second World War on a far 2
 3 larger scale, the German occupier's mobilization and exploitation of presumed 3
 4 'ethnic Germans' eventually resulted in a drastic reduction of German presence 4
 5 in Belgium once German power collapsed.⁷⁰ Perceived by the Belgian authorities 5
 6 as a fifth column, a safety risk, the departure from liberal views on immigrants 6
 7 and their descendants is obvious after the armistice. A straightforward blind 7
 8 expulsion from the country of all those who could be considered German in 8
 9 any way was quickly rejected. Still, a far larger share of Belgian Germans in 1918 9
 10 than in 1914 were considered a threat to the national community and had to 10
 11 be removed. It was a far-reaching, but still not blind cleansing of the Belgian 11
 12 community. The post-war Belgian policy went considerably further than a political 12
 13 purge; its ethnic component should not be ignored. The inhabitants of Belgium 13
 14 of German origin were collectively considered suspicious, but not by definition 14
 15 guilty. This caused the status of citizenship of immigrants and their descendants 15
 16 to be devalued compared to citizenship by descent. 16

17 As a result of the war experience, descent became more important for the 17
 18 concept of Belgianness, and immigrants of foreign origin had to prove that 18
 19 they had become loyal Belgians. This process of exalting descent would gain 19
 20 momentum in interwar policy of granting citizenship. By the start of the Second 20
 21 World War the exclusion from the Belgian nation due to one's ethnicity would be 21
 22 more outspoken. The First World War had provided the impetus for this ethnic 22
 23 selectiveness. In contrast to Nazi Germany, assimilation into the community of 23
 24 citizens remained in principle still possible for anyone coming to Belgium, and 24
 25 the radical collective exclusion of an ethnic group from among its citizens was 25
 26 never on the agenda. 26

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41 ⁷⁰ See, for example, Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: Nazi rule in Occupied Europe* 41
 42 (London, 2008), 539–50. 42